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Foundations for Freedom of
Conscience: Stronger than You
Might Think
Kathleen A. Brady*
Why protect conscience? In an insightful and challenging arti-
cle, Steven Smith explores this question and concludes that the
case for conscience is much weaker than the expanding rhetoric of
freedom of conscience in modern legal and public discourse sug-
gests.' When Smith speaks of conscience, he is referring to a per-
son's sincere convictions about what is morally required or
forbidden.2 A person acts from conscience when his or her actions
are based upon such sincere moral convictions. 3 It is a truism,
Smith acknowledges, that individuals should always act in accor-
dance with what they believe to be morally right, but why should
the larger society or the state accommodate claims of conscience
when an individual's conscience requires something that conflicts
with established social and legal rules? 4 Why should acts based on
* Associate Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. J.D.,
1994, Yale Law School; M.A.R., 1991, Yale Divinity School; B.A., 1989, Yale
College. My thanks to Ed Eberle for the opportunity to participate in this
symposium, to Dean David Logan and those at Roger Williams for their gra-
cious hospitality, to Steve Smith for the chance to ruminate and comment on
such an excellent and thought-provoking paper, and to all the symposium
participants for such rich contributions and discussion.
1. Steven D. Smith, The Tenuous Case for Conscience, 10 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 325, 325-26, 357-58 (2005).
2. Id. at 328.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 337-40. For Smith, accommodation need not take the form of an
exemption from generally applicable rules. See id. at 331 n.18. Accommoda-
tions can take different forms depending on the context and involve different
degrees of deference from the state. Smith is concerned with "whether and
why the state, or perhaps "society," should, at least as a prima facie matter,
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conscience receive special respect or deference from the govern-
ment when actions based on other types of sincere desires and mo-
tivations are not afforded the same protection? Indeed, the case
for conscience seems especially difficult to make when political de-
cision makers draw upon their own moral convictions in formulat-
ing the policies to which the conscientious dissenter objects.5 If
policy makers sincerely believe that the dissenter's moral convic-
tions are mistaken, why should the state take special steps to ac-
commodate these erroneous judgments?6
Smith argues that a strong case for freedom of conscience can
only be made "in rarified environments."7 In the past when moral-
ity was viewed by most citizens in objectivist terms and when
what Smith refers to as "moral authenticity"8 was regarded as a
moral good, respecting conscience, including erroneous conscience,
made sense. 9 These were the assumptions about morality em-
braced by Roger Williams and the leading proponents of freedom
of conscience in the founding era.10 Today, however, especially in
"the more reflective sectors of our society," objectivist accounts of
morality are highly contested." Now, conventionalist, subjectivist
and nihilist understandings of morality are more common, and
none of these perspectives can provide a strong foundation for re-
specting conscience. 12
In his article, Smith pursues a rigorous examination of the
types of assumptions about morality that are necessary to support
a tenable case for protecting conscience, and his analysis is force-
ful and thought-provoking. I am, however, not convinced that
moral objectivism alone provides the needed foundation for pro-
tecting conscience. To the contrary, conventionalist, subjectivist
and nihilist assumptions about morality all support persuasive
arguments for freedom of conscience. I do agree, however, that the
respect claims of conscience." Id. at 329-30 (emphasis added). He asks, "[o]n
what assumptions, moral or metaethical, would it seem sensible for the state
to give at least some degree of deference to claims of conscience?" Id. at 330.
5. See id. at 339-40.
6. See id.
7. Id. at 357.
8. Id. at 340-43.
9. Id. at 343, 357-58.
10. Id. at 342.
11. Id. at 358.
12. Id. at 357-58.
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case for conscience is stronger when it is based upon moral objec-
tivism, and that moral objectivism, combined with what Smith re-
fers to as moral authenticity, supports an especially convincing
defense of conscience. Indeed, I would go even further than Smith.
In my comments below, I argue that the particular combination of
moral objectivism and moral authenticity adopted by Roger Wil-
liams and later proponents of freedom of conscience in the found-
ing era provides a unique and uniquely compelling case for
protecting conscience.
I. DEFENDING CONSCIENCE FROM NONOBJECTIVIST ASSUMPTIONS
Smith begins the analysis in his article by describing a con-
crete situation that gives rise to a claim of conscience, and in the
discussion that follows, he seeks to demonstrate that the strength
of this claim will depend upon one's assumptions about the nature
of morality. Smith's scenario posits a wise and benevolent sover-
eign who has decided after careful deliberation to go to war with a
neighboring country and has required all healthy adult males to
serve in the army. 13 One of the sovereign's subjects believes that
the war is morally impermissible and on grounds of conscience re-
fuses to participate in the draft.14 Does the sovereign, Smith asks,
have any reason to excuse this conscientious objector from ser-
vice?' 5
According to Smith, the answer to this question depends upon
what the sovereign understands morality to be or, in other words,
upon his "metaethical" presuppostitions about the nature of mo-
rality. 16 Smith describes four different possibilities: objectivist,
conventionalist, subjectivist and nihilist metaethics. 17 According to
an objectivist understanding of morality, morality is something
"'real' or objective, something "given," "somehow 'there' apart
from our opinions about it.18 A conventionalist understanding of
morality views morality as a matter of convention or social prac-
tice; morality consists of "conventional rules and principles that a
13. Id. at 330.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 330-31
16. Id. at 329.
17. Id. at 332-34.
18. Id. at 332.
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society acepts."19 Subjectivist views of morality include a range of
ethical theories that envision morality as something "generated by
individual subjects."20 For the subjectivist, morality is self-
legislated.21 For the nihilist, morality is "not real at all -... it is
an illusion or sham, embraced by mistake or perhaps in an effort
of the weak to enslave the strong."22 According to Smith, of these
four metaethical presuppositions about the nature of morality,
only the objectivist view can support a strong case for conscience. 23
I am not convinced that metaethical objectivism alone sup-
plies strong reasons for protecting conscience. Conventionalism,
subjectivism and nihilism all support persuasive arguments for
protecting conscience. Let us begin with nihilism. According to
Smith, nihilist assumptions about morality are the least compati-
ble with freedom of conscience, and, indeed, nihilism "nullif[ies]
the case for respecting conscience." 24 Because the nihilist sover-
eign views morality as a sham or delusion, he will regard the con-
scientious objector as "deluded,"25 and he will have no reason for
viewing these delusional judgments as worthy of special respect.26
I agree with Smith that the nihilist sovereign will not view claims
of conscience as worthy of respect in themselves. These claims are,
after all, based on delusion. However, the nihilist sovereign does
have several reasons for protecting conscience that do not depend
on the inherent value or even existence of morality.
Suppose, for example, that the nihilist sovereign recognizes
that most ordinary people seem to demonstrate an innate propen-
sity for thinking in moral terms when they contemplate future ac-
tions and consider the direction of their lives more generally.
Despite the delusional nature of moral judgments, the sovereign's
citizens seem always to be making these moral judgments. Fur-
thermore, these moral convictions play a central role in the lives of
the sovereign's subjects; his citizens' moral convictions not only
guide action, but they also shape their sense of purpose and iden-
tity. The sovereign has tried to expose morality as a sham, but he
19. Id. at 333.
20. Id. (emphasis omitted).
21. Id.
22. Id. at334.
23. Id. at 357.
24. Id. at 356.
25. Id. at 357.
26. Id. at 356-57
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has not succeeded. The tendency to think and act morally is nearly
universal, and, indeed, it seems to be part of human nature. The
sovereign has also observed that because moral beliefs are so cen-
tral in his subjects' lives, forcing subjects to act against sincerely
held moral convictions is a wrenching experience that causes se-
vere psychological suffering and pain. Certainly, the nihilist sov-
ereign has noticed that any time his subjects are forced to act
against strongly held commitments, they experience significant
psychological pain, but the pain experienced when these commit-
ments are moral in nature is different. When a subject objects to
the state's policy on moral grounds, forcing her to do what she be-
lieves is morally wrong is experienced as destructive of her very
identity as a person. Thus, the nihilist sovereign may well decide
to accommodate conscience in order to avoid this type of severe
suffering.
Even if the nihilist sovereign is not concerned about his citi-
zens' well-being, he should see the wisdom in reducing such suffer-
ing whenever possible. Because moral convictions are so integral
to his subjects' sense of identity and personhood, dissenters are
likely to resist laws that require them to disobey conscience even
if resistance comes at great personal cost. If such resistance be-
comes widespread, it may lead to political instability and unrest.
The nihilist sovereign need not believe that morality is real in or-
der to value the peace and prosperity of his kingdom.
Moreover, even if the sovereign's dissenting subjects submit to
the sovereign's orders and do what they believe to be morally for-
bidden without resistance, civil peace and order are threatened.
The peace and order of the realm requires a citizenry that is law-
abiding, willing to follow social and legal rules, and ready to act
for the larger social good. Morality may be a delusion, but human-
ity's moral proclivities encourage such respect for laws and dedica-
tion to the public good. Forcing subjects to act contrary to
conscience will weaken conscience and with it social stability and
order. A wise nihilist sovereign may well conclude that it is better
to enjoy the fruits of false consciousness than undermine his sub-
jects' moral convictions.
A sovereign who embraces a subjectivist understanding of
morality will also have reasons for respecting conscience. For the
subjectivist sovereign, morality is not something objective that ex-
ists apart from our opinions about it. Rather, morality is self-
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legislated: individuals generate their own moral rules whether
from intuition, emotion, reason or some other basis.27 According to
Smith, it is difficult to understand just what the subjectivist
means when she describes a conviction as a "moral" conviction or
to explain how moral convictions differ from nonmoral judgments,
tastes or preferences.28 I am not convinced of this difficulty. For
the subjectivist, moral convictions are simply each person's beliefs
about what is right and wrong. An individual may dislike war,
fear war or believe that war is foolish, but all of those judgments
are different from the belief that war is wrong.29 Smith is correct
to observe that there may be nothing generalizable about the con-
tent of each person's moral beliefs. 30 For some, morality is based
on reason while for others it is based on the heart. 31 For some,
moral rules are standards that are universalizable to all other
moral agents while for others moral claims need not have this
broad appeal. 32 What moral convictions have in common is a
judgment about the rightness or wrongness of the matter in ques-
tion regardless of how individual moral subjects have come to ar-
rive at that conclusion.
But, why, asks Smith, should a sovereign who has adopted a
subjectivist metaethics give special deference to claims of con-
science when moral claims may be based upon so many different
and even idiosyncratic criteria?33 To see why, suppose that our
subjectivist sovereign, like many moral subjectivists today, has
adopted a subjectivist understanding of morality after self-
consciously rejecting an older view of morality as something objec-
tive, for example, as something given by a transcendent Creator
who has shaped human nature and human ends. Our subjectivist
sovereign no longer believes that God exists. There are only indi-
viduals who create their own moral standards, but therein, says
27. Id. at 333.
28. Id. at 351-52.
29. Cf. Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, 25
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87, 128 (1996) ("Morality is a distinct, independent dimen-
sion of our experience, and it exercises its own sovereignty.").
30. See Smith, supra note 1, at 352-56.
31. Smith finds attempts to distinguish moral beliefs from other prefer-
ences on the basis of rational consistency unconvincing. See id. at 353-56.
32. Smith also rejects universalizability as a criterion for distinguishing
moral and nonmoral views. See id.
33. See id. at 356.
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the sovereign, lies our human dignity. We each are lawgivers to
ourselves, each little gods, and our dignity lies in this capacity to
create and pursue our own moral vision. To be sure, we may be
tempted to despair in a lonely universe without a transcendent
source, meaning or purpose, but our capacity to determine our
own moral rules and shape our own sense of meaning is our conso-
lation. It is in choosing that we gain our worth and value, not in
what is chosen. A sovereign who holds such views will surely try
to accommodate her subjects' ability to make and pursue their
own moral choices as much as possible.
A conventionalist understanding of morality also provides
reasons for protecting conscience. According to Smith, the conven-
tionalist sovereign views the moral order as purely a matter of so-
cial convention. 34 Moral rules are simply the ethical norms that a
society accepts. 35 In Smith's view, a conventionalist sovereign has
no reason to protect conscience because he will view the position of
the conscientious objector as mistaken and confused.36 For exam-
ple, if the sovereign's decision to go to war is supported by the lar-
ger community, a dissenter who objects to the war on moral
grounds is not making a coherent moral judgment. For the con-
ventionalist, moral rules are determined by social convention, and
when the conscientious objector dissents from the community's
judgment, her position does not make sense as a moral claim. It is,
rather, an idiosyncratic view that falls outside the community's
moral conventions altogether. The dissenter may present her posi-
tion as a more faithful interpretation of the community's moral
practices than the position of the sovereign and the majority of his
subjects, but if the dissenter does not succeed in changing the
minds of her fellow citizens, to press her argument further on
moral grounds makes no sense.37 According to Smith, "in being
idiosyncratic [the dissenter] cannot plausibly claim to be - or be
viewed as being - more truly conventional than the conventions
themselves."38
Smith acknowledges that there may be conventionalist socie-
ties that place a high value on what he refers to as individual
34. See id. at 343-48.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 344-48.
37. Id. at 347-48.
38. Id. at 348.
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"moral authenticity." 9 Such a society will value the ability of indi-
viduals to live in accordance with their moral convictions and to be
"true" to themselves regardless of whether their beliefs are correct
or mistaken. 40 Smith recognizes that the sovereign in such a soci-
ety might decide to protect conscience in order to avoid forcing in-
dividuals to be false to their moral convictions. However, Smith
argues that such a conventionalist culture is "improbable"41 and
"deeply unstable."42 For conventionalists, "social practices and be-
liefs are the locus and essence of morality, and our duty is to con-
form to them."43 There is, therefore, a built-in resistance within
conventionalist cultures to valuing and protecting the individual's
ability to pursue different paths."
The weakness of Smith's argument that conventionalism does
not support a strong case for freedom of conscience is that his ar-
gument rests upon too simplistic an understanding of convention-
alist ethics. Smith assumes that those who hold a conventionalist
view of morality will simply equate morality with existing social
conventions. Morality is, for the conventionalist, determined by
social convention; it is quite simply what the community thinks it
is. Thus, if a dissenter with different views is unable to convince
the community to change prevailing conventions, the dissenter's
position does not make sense as a moral claim. The dissenter's
views fall outside the content of morality in a conventionalist
framework, and there is no reason for the conventionalist sover-
eign to give them special deference.
However, consider a conventionalist sovereign with a more
sophisticated understanding of morality. Our more sophisticated
sovereign has been a studious observer of human nature, social re-
lations and the history of her country. She has observed that mo-
rality is a complex social practice. While she believes that morality
is a social creation, she thinks that it would be a mistake to sim-
ply equate morality with the content of existing social norms.
Such an equation does not adequately account for the fact that the
content of any society's ethical conventions is constantly changing
39. Id. at 349-50.
40. See id. at 340-42.
41. Id. at 350.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 350-51.
44. Id.
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and developing over time. Morality is an ongoing tradition that is
continuously renewing itself, not simply a set of social conven-
tions. The process by which morality develops over time is multi-
faceted. It seems, our sovereign observes, to be guided by a variety
of social goals. Some of these goals are constant through time,
such as civil peace and order, economic development, and the
maximization of the physical and mental welfare of community
members. Other goals seem to change with time, such as a press-
ing need to repel attack by a new and dangerous enemy. Our sov-
ereign further observes that change occurs in response to a range
of different stimuli. New experiences and information may, for ex-
ample, require new moral standards in order for society to func-
tion well and meet social goals. Encounters with new moral
perspectives from groups outside the community may lead the
community to revise its own ethical norms as may novel ideas
from those within.
Our sovereign does not fear change but, rather, views it as es-
sential for social progress. Familiarity with the history of her own
country has taught her that change can generate improved under-
standings of basic moral principles, better ways to reach enduring
social goals, and better explanations for new facts and informa-
tion. From her studies, our sovereign concludes that wise govern-
ment requires humility and the recognition that the social norms
of any single generation are limited and provisional. Thus, for our
sovereign, it would be a mistake to too readily equate morality
with current social norms. Morality is better understood as an on-
going tradition that changes over time, often in progressive direc-
tions, and our sovereign wants to facilitate such change.
Certainly, freedom to articulate and express new ideas will be es-
sential.
Moreover, and perhaps most important for our purposes, our
sovereign has noticed that individuals often play an important
role in the process by which conventions develop and progress.
Morality is created in community, but subgroups and individuals
with novel ideas are central to this process of formation and
growth. The example of Roger Williams has not escaped our sov-
ereign. As an unpopular defender of religious liberty in early
America, Williams challenged ideas about the relationship be-
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tween church and state that had been embraced by the Christian
community for over 1300 years.45 Williams did not achieve imme-
diate success. It took another century for his ideas to begin to take
root in America, but today, what began as a seemingly idiosyn-
cratic view has been embraced by Christians throughout the
world. Roger Williams's rejection of religious persecution and
church-state entanglement has proved to be the more faithful in-
terpretation of Christian principles as well as the better founda-
tion for civil peace and prosperity.
The example of Roger Williams has impressed upon our sov-
ereign the need to protect dissenting views, especially unpopular
ones. In Roger Williams our sovereign has seen the dissenting in-
dividual play the role of trail-blazer. At other times in history, the
individual dissenter has been the moral conscience of the commu-
nity, calling and reminding the community to live up to its moral
ideals. At still other times, the example of dissenters has checked
and restrained the hasty judgments of unreflective social and po-
litical decision makers. Indeed, in the case of past wars, conscien-
tious objectors have played an important role in challenging the
community to deliberate carefully about the wisdom and morality
of using violence to advance national interests. During some of
these wars, conscientious objectors have proved to be the commu-
nity's better half. Our sovereign is convinced that war is morally
permissible now, but history still cautions her that she may be
wrong and that the dissenter may be the example of true progress.
With all this in mind, our sovereign concludes that it is essential
to accommodate the sincere moral convictions of her subjects
wherever possible. The freedom of dissenters to pursue and wit-
ness novel and even unpopular ideas is critical to the vitality of
social conventions.
In my view, Smith also overestimates the tension between
conventionalist moral views and a commitment to individual
moral authenticity. According to Smith, because conventionalism
equates morality with social convention, the conventionalist val-
ues conformity to social rules and resists accommodation of dis-
senting views.46 While it is certainly possible that such a tension
45. See generally JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE BELIEVERS AND THE POWERS
THAT ARE 67 (1987).
46. See Smith, supra note 1, at 350-51.
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may exist in some conventionalist cultures, it need not. Imagine,
for example, a community of conventionalists who believe that
humanity's capacity for moral reasoning and decision making is a
source of great human dignity. In their view, the content of moral-
ity derives from social convention, but the primary value of moral-
ity lies in the individual's capacity to make and act upon moral
decisions. It is the exercise of moral decision making that gives
humanity its great worth. Most individuals will simply appropri-
ate existing moral norms when they make moral decisions. Others
may resist these norms (though none can escape the central role
that social convention plays in shaping and defining the moral
landscape within which individuals act). What matters, in either
case, is not so much the choice that the individual makes, but that
individuals deliberately and authentically act in accordance with
their own moral convictions. Therein lies human dignity, and co-
ercing those with dissenting views would violate this dignity.
Even if the conventionalist community that I have posited in-
cludes some, or even many, members who do care about the par-
ticular choices that individuals make and would like to see
individual moral choices conform to social convention, they will re-
ject coercion as a mechanism to achieve this goal. Coercion may
produce outward conformity, but if the minds of dissenters are not
changed, these dissenters will be acting in a way that is false to
their moral beliefs. Such inauthenticity is itself a moral evil. Per-
suasion, not coercion, is the only route to achieving moral confor-
mity without sacrificing moral authenticity. Thus, for the
members of this conventionalist community, the truism that "a
person should always do what he or she believes to be right"47 is
not just a prescription for individuals. It is a norm that must be
respected by the larger community and reflected in its legal and
social rules. The larger community must respect the conscience
that the individual is bound to follow.
II. DEFENDING CONSCIENCE FROM OBJECTIVIST ASSUMPTIONS
While I have argued that conventionalism, subjectivism and
nihilism all supply reasons for protecting conscience, I do agree
with Smith that the stronger foundation is moral objectivism. In
47. Id. at 337.
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Smith's view, moral objectivism alone is not sufficient. 48 An objec-
tivist sovereign who believes that his dissenting subject is mis-
taken about what the objective moral order requires will not be
persuaded to accommodate what he views as error without some
additional premise or claim.49 After rejecting several possibilities,
Smith argues that a commitment to individual moral authenticity
supplies such a premise.50 A commitment to moral authenticity
means prizing the ability of individuals to live in accordance with
their moral convictions and, thereby, to be true to themselves re-
gardless of whether their beliefs are true or false.51 If the objectiv-
ist sovereign believes that individual moral authenticity is a good
of the highest order, forcing even a mistaken subject to act against
sincere moral convictions is a moral evil to be avoided whenever
possible.
Smith suggests that only moral authenticity can supply the
needed premise for respecting conscience in an objectivist con-
text.52 On this point, I disagree. In my view, moral objectivism
need not be accompanied by a commitment to authenticity to sup-
port a tenable case for conscience. A variety of other premises
would also give the objectivist sovereign persuasive reasons for
protecting conscience. For example, suppose that the objectivist
sovereign believes that there is an objective moral order but also
believes that this order encompasses multiple conflicting and
incommensurable goods. In other words, our objectivist sovereign
embraces what is often referred to as value pluralism in contem-
porary political philosophy.53 If the sovereign is a value pluralist,
he will have good reasons for accommodating those who do not
agree with his moral judgments. Citizens who embrace different
moral convictions about war or other social issues are not neces-
sarily wrong. They may simply be adopting a competing concep-
48. Id. at 336-37.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 340-43.
51. Id. at 340-42.
52. See id. at 357-58 (stating that within an objectivist framework, "it
seems that freedom of conscience depends on a moral position that assigns
preeminent value to something like 'authenticity,' even over conduct that con-
forms to objective moral truth.").
53. For an account of value pluralism by a leading proponent of this view,
see WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE
PLURALISM FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 29-35 (2002).
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tion of the good which is just as legitimate as the values adopted
by the sovereign. A sovereign who believes that the moral order
includes a wide range of diverse and competing ways of life, all of
which are morally legitimate, will favor protecting dissenting
views that are different from his own. 54 While the value pluralist
sovereign may not be persuaded to protect those dissenting views
that fall outside the scope of legitimate ways of life, the sovereign
who is realistic about the difficulty of evaluating the legitimacy of
competing perspectives has strong reasons to protect as much dis-
sent as possible.
Alternatively, let us suppose that our objectivist sovereign is
not a value pluralist but, nevertheless, believes that his under-
standing of moral truth is incomplete. Such a sovereign will also
favor protecting dissenting convictions. Like the conventionalist
sovereign discussed above, this objectivist sovereign is humble
about the accuracy of his moral judgments and recognizes that his
views may be limited and provisional. He concludes, therefore,
that broad protections for dissent are necessary to ensure that er-
rors are exposed and progress towards truth is achieved. Even if
the objectivist sovereign is certain that his judgments (and his
judgments alone) are correct, he will, like the nihilist sovereign,
want to avoid weakening the consciences of his citizens by forcing
them to do what they believe is wrong. Such force will not con-
vince his citizens of the truth, but will only enervate conscience al-
together.
In each of these cases, the objectivist sovereign has reasons
for protecting conscience that do not depend upon a commitment
to moral authenticity. Moral authenticity certainly supports free-
dom of conscience in an objectivist setting, but it is not the only
premise that does so.
Smith is correct, however, that moral objectivism provides a
stronger foundation for conscience than conventionalism, subjec-
tivism or nihilism. Whenever moral objectivism is combined with
an additional premise or premises that support freedom of con-
science, the case for conscience is stronger than defenses available
in other settings. Although objectivist arguments for conscience
54. See id. at 119 ("A liberal pluralist society will organize itself around
the principle of maximum feasible accommodation of diverse legitimate ways
of life, limited only by the minimum requirements of civic unity.").
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may appear similar to arguments made in other contexts (and
some of the arguments that I have developed above do), objectivist
arguments have greater force than conventionalist, subjectivist or
nihilist defenses. The strength of the objectivist case derives from
the way that morality is understood in the objectivist context. For
the objectivist, morality is neither a human creation nor a sham.
It is really "real." The moral order exists prior to social conven-
tions and individual judgments, and it provides the standard for
all human conduct and social relations. Human communities and
their members exist under its judgment. This priority of objectiv-
ist morality over human convention means that the demands of
the moral order have a special authority within the community.
Morality is "higher law": its requirements must be observed even
when obedience is difficult or costly. Thus, where the moral order
requires freedom of conscience, freedom has primacy. The objectiv-
ist sovereign who believes that moral authenticity is a good of the
highest order will, therefore, have extremely strong reasons for
protecting conscience, as will the objectivist sovereign who recog-
nizes that his understanding of moral truth is limited and that
dissent may be the source of greater knowledge. Likewise, the
value pluralist who realizes that the dissenter's competing concep-
tion of the good may be as legitimate as his own also has very
strong reasons to do what he can to protect all legitimate visions
of the good. Even the sovereign who believes that his moral judg-
ments alone are true must be careful not to weaken the conscience
of his subjects. If dissenting subjects are forced to do what they
think is wrong, their commitment to moral truth altogether will be
undermined. Thus, whenever an objectivist sovereign believes
that respect for morality or the preservation or discovery of moral
truth requires freedom of conscience, he will have very strong rea-
sons to protect this freedom.
By contrast, freedom of conscience is more vulnerable in con-
ventionalist, subjectivist and nihilist settings. All of these perspec-
tives view morality as a human creation. Morality is not higher
law that exists outside of us and over us and our communities.
Morality has no authority independent of the status that we give
to it, and moral values have no inherent priority over competing
social values and interests. Thus, in conventionalist, subjectivist
and nihilist societies, freedom of conscience may easily be overrid-
den by competing social interests. For example, the conventional-
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ist sovereign who understands the benefits of freedom of con-
science may, nevertheless, be tempted to limit protections when
she is convinced that dissent threatens other important social val-
ues or when she finds the message of dissenters to be especially
offensive or repugnant. Likewise, the subjectivist sovereign who
believes that human dignity lies in the capacity of individuals to
create and pursue their own moral visions may be tempted to re-
strict freedom of conscience in cases where dissenting views are
particularly unpopular and, thus, endanger civic harmony or some
other public good. The nihilist will be especially likely to limit
freedom of conscience whenever it does not serve his own interests
or the interests of his realm. In short, whenever morality is
merely a human creation, it is at the mercy of its human creators.
The temptations to restrict freedom of conscience when it is costly
will always be strong, but conscience is especially vulnerable in
communities that do not link morality to an objective order that
demands obedience even when obedience becomes difficult.
I also agree with Smith that moral objectivism combined with
a commitment to moral authenticity provides an especially strong
foundation for freedom of conscience. As Smith observes, moral ob-
jectivism combined with a commitment to moral authenticity was
one of the primary justifications for conscience advocated by Roger
Williams,55 and it also grounded arguments for freedom of con-
55. See Smith, supra note 1, at 342. Williams made a number of other ar-
guments as well. Williams's defense of conscience focused on matters of reli-
gious belief and worship, see infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text, and he
argued, for example, that governments are just as likely to suppress religious
truth as they are to suppress error. See ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOUDY
TENENT, OF PERSECUTION, FOR CAUSE OF CONSCIENCE (1644) [hereinafter
WILLIAMS, BLOUDY TENENT], reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER
WILLIAMS 1, 117, 136-37, 184-85, 206 (Russell & Russell, Inc. 1963). Williams
also noted that Christ rejected the use of force. Id. at 117, 219, 425; ROGER
WILLIAMS, QUERIES OF HIGHEST CONSIDERATION (1644), reprinted in 2 THE
COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS, supra, at 241, 266-67. For Williams,
God works through the Spirit of grace and his Word, not coercion. See
WILLIAMS, BLOUDY TENENT, supra, at 80-81, 136, 160-61. Moreover, Williams
argued that church and state are strictly separate, and, thus, the role of the
state extends only to temporal matters, such as preserving civil peace and
protecting the life and property of citizens. See id. at 73, 160-61; ROGER
WILLIAMS, THE BLOODY TENENT YET MORE BLOODY (1652), reprinted in 4 THE
COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS, supra, at 1, 81, 185; ROGER
WILLIAMS, MR. COTTON'S LETTER LATELY PRINTED, EXAMINED AND ANSWERED
(1644), reprinted in 1 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS, supra, at
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science in the founding era. This combination of moral assump-
tions has had a tremendous influence on the development of
American law, and this impact demonstrates the power of these
assumptions. Indeed, I would go even further than Smith. A close
examination of the particular type of moral objectivism and moral
authenticity embraced by Williams and leading defenders of con-
science in the founding era reveals a unique and uniquely compel-
ling case for conscience.
As Smith observes, in matters of religious belief and worship,
Williams and later proponents of conscience in the founding era
rejected force and were committed to voluntarism. They agreed
that correct doctrine and worship without interior conviction is
worthless in God's eyes. In Williams's words, "without faith and
true persuasion," worship is a sin.56 Founding-era Baptist Isaac
Backus explained that "[tirue religion is a voluntary obedience
unto God,"57 and "Christ will have no pressed soldiers in his
army."58 Thomas Jefferson and James Madison agreed. According
to Jefferson, God "will not save men against their wills," 59 and
Madison insisted that it is the "duty of every man to render to the
Creator such homage and such only as he believes to be acceptable
to him."60 Not all of these figures would have completely endorsed
Smith's description of moral authenticity. They certainly believed
313, 325. In addition, Williams observed that coercing conscience leads to
civil unrest and bloodshed. WLL4MS, BLOuDY TENENT, supra, at 117, 219,
424. Coercion is also counterproductive: it weakens conscience, fosters hypoc-
risy, and tends to harden the convictions of those in error. See EDMUND S.
MORGAN, ROGER WILLIAMS: THE CHURCH AND THE STATE 139 (1967).
56. WILLIAMS, BLOUDY TENENT, supra note 55, at 12.
57. ISAAC BACKUS, GOVERNMENT AND LIBERTY DESCRIBED (1778), reprinted
in ISAAC BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM : PAMPHLETS, 1754-1789,
at 345, 351 (William G. McLoughlin ed., 1968); see also ISAAC BACKUS, AN
APPEAL TO THE PUBLIC FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1773), reprinted in ISAAC
BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM: PAMPHLETS, 1754-1789, supra, at
303, 324; ISAAC BACKUS, A DOOR OPENED FOR CHRISTIAN LIBERTY (1783) [here-
inafter BACKUS, A DOOR OPENED], reprinted in ISAAC BACKUS ON CHURCH,
STATE, AND CALVINISM : PAMPHLETS, 1754-1789, supra, at 427, 438.
58. ISAAC BACKUS, A FISH CAUGHT IN HIs OwN NET (1768), reprinted in
ISAAC BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM: PAMPHLETS, 1754-1789, su-
pra note 57, at 167, 198.
59. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON RELIGION (c. 1776), in SAUL K.
PADOVER, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 937, 943 (1943).
60. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS
ASSESSMENTS (1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295, 299(Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1973).
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that being true to one's religious convictions and acting in accor-
dance with these convictions is essential for salvation. However,
at least for Williams and founding-era Baptist supporters of con-
science, living in accordance with one's beliefs is not enough. If
one's beliefs are mistaken, being true to them will not be sufficient
to gain salvation. One must also have the correct convictions.
Force is wrong because outward conformity is never enough in
God's eyes, not because acting in accordance with one's beliefs is
itself a moral good. Nevertheless, their commitment to moral au-
thenticity as they understood it certainly grounds a strong argu-
ment for conscience. If voluntariness is essential in religious life,
coercing the erroneous conscience can do no good, and it will al-
ways undermine the moral worth of one's actions.
There is yet more at stake for Williams and founding-era pro-
ponents of conscience. When Smith describes their insistence upon
voluntariness in matters of religion as one example of a more gen-
eral commitment to moral authenticity, he risks obscuring the
unique reasons why voluntariness was so important for them. For
Williams and the founders, acting in accordance with one's convic-
tions is essential in matters of religion because God desires to be
in a free and willing relationship with the persons he has created.
Williams and founding-era proponents of conscience believed that
humanity has been created in relationship to God and that con-
science is the medium for this relationship. All persons have con-
science, 61 and it is through conscience that we come to know about
God and what he requires. 62
Williams and later defenders of conscience disagreed about
the extent to which conscience is informed by reason or revelation,
61. ROGER WILLIAMS, THE COPY OF A LETTER OF ROGER WILLIAMS OF
PROVIDENCE, IN NEW ENGLAND, TO MAJOR ENDICOT, GOVERNOR OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS (1651) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, LETTER TO MAJOR ENDICOTI,
reprinted in 6 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS, supra note 55, at
214, 219-20; see also MORGAN, supra note 55, at 128, 134.
62. See MORGAN, supra note 55, at 130, 133 (describing Puritan views
about conscience shared by Williams). Thus, in the founding era, religious
convictions were commonly referred to as "the dictates of conscience": con-
science is the vehicle by which we understand God and his commands. The
frequent use of this phrase is illustrated well by its appearance in numerous
state constitutions adopted after 1776. See MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. II;
N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. 1, art. V; N.J. CONST. of 1776, arts. XVIII-XIX; N.C.
CONST. of 1776, art. XIX; PA. CONST. of 1776, art. II; VT. CONST. of 1777, art.
III; VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS (1776) § 16.
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mind or heart, intuition or deliberation, nature or grace, the direct
action of the Spirit or the guiding hand of the religious commu-
nity. As a Calvinist Puritan, Williams believed that conscience
was radically fallen. 63 While natural conscience retains knowledge
of basic moral laws,64 correct understanding in purely religious
matters such as doctrine and worship requires the assistance of
God through revelation as well as the power of the Spirit enlight-
ening the mind to understand scripture correctly.65 Founding-era
Baptist supporters of conscience agreed with Williams though
they put less emphasis on human learning and even more upon
the direct work of the Spirit on the individual's mind and heart. 66
By contrast, for founders influenced by Enlightenment rational-
ism, reason plays a more prominent role in informing conscience,
and Thomas Jefferson even insisted that reason is the "only ora-
cle" by which one comes to the knowledge of religious truths.67
63. See MORGAN, supra note 55, at 11.
64. Id. at 128.
65. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, BLOUDY TENENT, supra note 55, at 80 (stating
that conversion of heretics is something "which onely the finger of God can
doe, that is the mighty power of the Spirit in the Word"); id. at 136 ("But to
recover a Soule from Satan by repentance, and to bring them from Antichris-
tian doctrine or worship, to the doctrine or worship Christian, in the least
true internall or externall submission, that only works the All-power-full
God, by the sword of the Spirit in the hand of his Spiritual officers."); id. at
160-61 (arguing that "Spirituall and Soul-causes, Spirituall and Soule pun-
ishment.., belongs to that Spirituall sword with two edges, the Soule-
piercing (in Soule-saving or Soule-killing), the Word of God") (emphasis omit-
ted); MORGAN, supra note 55, at 11-13, 130-31, 133-34.
66. According to Isaac Backus, the Spirit "seal[s] his truth to the[]
hearts" of believers, ISAAC BACKUS, A DISCOURSE SHOWING THE NATURE AND
NECESSITY OF AN INTERNAL CALL TO PREACH THE EVERLASTING GOSPEL (1754),
reprinted in ISAAC BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM: PAMPHLETS,
1754-1789, supra note 57, at 65, 104, and "enlightens [their] minds to under-
stand [God's] word aright." Id. at 76. John Leland's words describing the
"power of the gospel in the hand of the spirit" are especially dramatic: the
word of God "tears off the veil of the heart-rends the stupor from the con-
science-removes the film from the eye of the soul. . ... " JOHN LELAND,
SERMON PREACHED AT ANKRAM, DUTCHESS COUNTY, N.Y., AT THE ORDINATION
OF REV. LUMAN BIRCH (1806), reprinted in THE WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER
JOHN LELAND 300, 305 (L.F. Greene ed., New York, G.W. Wood 1845).
67. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Miles King (Sept. 26, 1814), in 14
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 196, 197 (Andrew Lipscomb & Albert
Bergh eds., 1903-04); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. 10,
1787), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 256, 261. For Jef-
ferson, the connection between God and persons is through reason rather
than revelation or the work of the Spirit, and it is up to the individual to seek
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However, all agreed that conscience only operates by under-
standing and persuasion. 68 God has chosen to relate to us not as
automatons or puppets or unreflective beings; he has made us to
God through free investigation. See Kathleen A. Brady, Fostering Harmony
Among the Justices: How Contemporary Debates in Theology Can Help to
Reconcile the Divisions on the Court Regarding Religious Expression by the
State, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 433, 451 (1999) [hereinafter Brady, Fostering
Harmony]. While Jefferson believed that the heart is the source of moral
knowledge, see Kathleen A. Brady, Reflections on the Light: Judge Noonan's
Contributions to the Debate on Religion in the Public Square, 1 U. ST. THOMAS
L.J. 480, 492 n.108 (2003) [hereinafter Brady, Reflections], it is through the
mind that we relate to God, and humanity is not so fallen that special grace
is required.
James Madison had a broader view of the means by which persons
come to know God. Reason plays a role in informing this relationship, see
Letter from James Madison to Frederick Beasley (Nov. 20, 1825), in 9 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 229, 230 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1900-10), but so
does revelation, MADISON, supra note 60, at 303 (referring to the "light of
revelation"), as well as intuition and common sense. See James Madison,
Notes for Debates on the General Assessment Bill (Dec. 1784), in 8 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 60, at 195, 198 (observing the "propen-
sity of man to Religion"); Letter from James Madison to Edward Everett
(Mar. 19, 1823), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra, at 124, 126-27
(stating that "there are causes in the human breast, which ensure the perpe-
tuity of religion"); Letter from James Madison to Reverend Adams (1832), in
9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra, at 484, 485 (observing humanity's
"propensities & susceptibilities" to religion and stating that "[t]here appears
to be in the nature of man what insures his belief in an invisible cause of his
present existence, and anticipation of his future existence"); Letter from
James Madison to Frederick Beasley, supra, at 230-31 (arguing that "the in-
finity of time & space forces itself on our conception ... ; that the mind pre-
fers at once the idea of a self-existing cause ... ; and that it finds more
facility in assenting to the self-existence of an invisible cause possessing infi-
nite power, wisdom & goodness"); see also Brady, Fostering Harmony, supra,
at 457-58 (noting the influence of "Scottish Common Sense Realism" on
Madison's thought, including the idea that basic beliefs about God and moral-
ity are self-evident propositions seen with intuitive force); Ralph L. Ketcham,
James Madison and Religion: A New Hypothesis, in JAMES MADISON ON
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 175, 177, 179-80 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1985) (discussing
the influence of Scottish Common Sense philosophy on Madison's religious
views). For James Madison's teacher, John Witherspoon, the guiding hand of
the religious community and tradition also play a significant role. JOHN
WITHERSPOON, LECTURES ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY, in THE SELECTED WRITINGS
OF JOHN WITHERSPOON 152, 167, 173 (Thomas Miller ed., 1990); see also
Brady, Fostering Harmony, supra, at 459-60.
68. Indeed, Williams defined conscience as "a persuasion fixed in the
mind and heart of a man, which enforceth him to judge.., and to do so and
so, with respect to God, his worship, &c." WILLIAMS, LETTER TO MAJOR
ENDICOT, supra note 61, at 219 (emphasis added).
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know and serve him by understanding and willing assent. For
early American defenders of conscience, this relationship was sa-
cred. Williams described the relationship between God and the
saved sinner as a "Heavenly Marriage" characterized by love and
consent.69 For Isaac Backus, God was a loving parent.70 James
Madison described a less intimate relationship when he referred
to God as "Governour of the Universe" and "Universal Sovereign"
and to persons as his "subject [s] ,"71 but conscience was no less "sa-
cred" for him.72 All also agreed that this relationship is deeply per-
sonal, a matter between "God and individuals."73 Thus, for
69. ROGER WILLIAMS, EXPERIMENTS OF SPIRITUAL LIFE & HEALTH, AND
THEIR PRESERVATIVES (1652), reprinted in 7 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF
ROGER WILLIAMS, supra note 55, at 45, 51.
70. Backus points to 1 John 2: 18-27: "And John says, little children ye
have an unction from the holy one, and ye know all things, and the anointing
which ye have received of him abideth in you; and ye need not that any man
teach you but as the same anointing teacheth you of all things." BACKUS, su-
pra note 58, at 230; see also John Leland, Sermon Preached in Philadelphia
(Apr. 17, 1814), in THE WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER JOHN LELAND, supra
note 66, at 376, 379 ("Christ promised to be with his faithful servants unto
the end of the world.").
71. MADISON, supra note 60, at 299.
72. James Madison, Essay in the National Gazette (Mar. 27, 1792), re-
printed in JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 67, at 76, 77.
73. BACKUS, A DOOR OPENED, supra note 57, at 432 ("religion is ever a
matter between God and individuals"); JOHN LELAND, THE VIRGINIA
CHRONICLE (1790), reprinted in THE WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER JOHN
LELAND, supra note 66, at 92, 108 ("religion is entirely a matter between God
and individuals"); see also JOHN LELAND, THE RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE
INALIENABLE (1791), reprinted in THE WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER JOHN
LELAND, supra note 66, at 177, 181 ("religion is a matter between God and
individuals"); JOHN LELAND, A BLOW AT THE ROOT (1801), reprinted in THE
WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER JOHN LELAND, supra note 66, at 233, 249 ("relig-
ion is, at all times and places, a matter between God and individuals"); see
also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to A Committee of the Danbury Baptist
Association (Jan. 1, 1802), in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra
note 67, at 281, 281 (arguing that "religion is a matter which lies solely be-
tween man and his God"); MADISON, supra note 60, at 300 ("If [religious] free-
dom be abused, it is an offense against God, not against man: To God,
therefore, not to man, must an account of it be rendered.").
Isaac Backus expresses this vividly: "[Aill saints know that when
they received Christ they had no creature to see for them, but each soul acted
as singly towards God as if there had not been another person in the world."
BACKUS, supra note 58, at 273. Williams also describes a deeply personal re-
lationship between the individual and God when he refers to the relationship
between God and the saved sinner as a "Heavenly Marriage." WILLIAMS, su-
pra note 69, at 51; see also supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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Williams and founding-era defenders of conscience, forcing con-
science is so great an evil because it interferes with this relation-
ship between God and persons. Indeed, nothing can be more
important than respecting conscience because nothing can be
more important than protecting an authentic relationship between
God and individuals.
When Williams and later leaders in the founding era defended
liberty of conscience, they focused on freedom for religious belief
and worship. It is not clear that they would have extended liberty
of conscience to the type of moral dissent that Smith addresses.
Without any familiarity with the moral pluralism that character-
izes modem American society, they did not squarely face the is-
sue. Williams and those in the founding era agreed with their
contemporaries about the content of morality.74 Indeed, when
Roger Williams observed that Christian and non-Christian alike
agreed on the same basic moral principles, he concluded (as did
other Puritans of his day) that conscience functions well in moral
matters even without the special aid of revelation. 75 Aside from re-
ligious objections to military service (which Madison would have
accommodated 76 but Williams would not have77), genuine dissent
in seventeenth and eighteenth century America was limited to
matters of religious belief and worship.78 In such an environment,
74. See Brady, Reflections, supra note 67, at 491-95; MORGAN, supra note
55, at 128.
75. See MORGAN, supra note 55, at 128.
76. When Madison introduced his initial proposal for the Bill of Rights in
Congress in June of 1789, he included a provision that would have exempted
those "scrupulous of bearing arms" from military service. ARLIN M. ADAMS &
CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 17 (1990).
77. See PERRY MILLER, ROGER WILLIAMS: HIS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE
AMERICAN TRADITION 224-26 (1953) (excerpting and discussing Letter from
Roger Williams to the Town of Providence (Jan. 1655), which can also be
found in 6 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS, supra note 55, at
278).
78. See Brady, Reflections, supra note 67, at 491-95. Williams and those
in the founding era could envision moral standards different from their own,
but they did not encounter such standards often and viewed them as the ab-
errant beliefs of a few deviant individuals or groups, not as genuine moral di-
versity. See MORGAN, supra note 55, at 134-35 (stating that "though
[Williams] did not specifically say so, Williams doubtless thought it incum-
bent on government to punish those Quakers who were led by the inner light
to go naked in public, a practice that deeply offended Williams and that ap-
peared to him to be condemned even by the unenlightened natural con-
sciences of barbarians"); Brady, Reflections, supra note 67, at 494-95 (arguing
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there was little need to protect moral dissent.
However, as Smith assumes, the reasons that Williams and
founding-era figures gave for liberty of conscience in matters of re-
ligious belief and worship easily extend to moral issues in a mor-
ally pluralistic environment. For Williams and those in the
founding era, moral rules are just as much a part of humanity's
relationship with God as purely religious duties. Like purely reli-
gious duties, moral rules have their source in God's will, and con-
science is the mechanism for apprehending moral as well as
religious knowledge.7 9 Thus, where genuine disagreement exists,
force in matters of morality, just like force in matters of religious
belief and worship, will undermine the individual's relationship
with God. To coerce an individual to do what she thinks is morally
forbidden is to force her to violate this relationship, and forced
conduct, even if in conformity with the truth, cannot substitute for
free obedience.
Indeed, the reasons that Williams and founding-era propo-
nents of conscience offer for protecting conscience also justify re-
spect for conscience where the dissenter does not recognize a
divine source for her moral convictions. The voice of conscience
connects persons to God even where the divine character of this
relationship is not fully understood. The person who obeys con-
science obeys the witness of God "written on theD [human]
heart." 0 Disobedience, by contrast, shuts out this witness. Forcing
an individual to disobey sincerely held moral convictions weakens
conscience and undermines this connection between God and per-
sons.
At this point, my reader may raise an obvious objection to the
power of this early American case for conscience. Whatever their
persuasive force in the past, the religious assumptions embraced
by Williams and those in the founding era do not ground a compel-
ling case for conscience today. In modem America, many indi-
that "[wihile it was possible for those in the founding era to conceive of moral
principles that diverged from settled opinion..., such principles were viewed
as the deranged imaginings of deviant individuals or groups").
79. See MORGAN, supra note 55, at 128 (discussing Williams's thought).
In the founding era, it was widely assumed that morality was a significant
aspect of religion, and those in the founding era generally agreed that virtue
was essential for the success of popular government and that religion was es-
sential for morality. See Brady, Reflections, supra note 67, at 491-94.
80. Romans 2:15.
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viduals no longer believe in God, and as Smith observes, moral ob-
jectivism itself is hotly contested. How can a defense of conscience
based upon a religious account of moral objectivism and moral au-
thenticity have persuasive force today? Are not conventionalist,
subjectivist and nihilist defenses the only justifications with broad
appeal?
In my view, the religious assumptions that Williams and
founding-era defenders of conscience make cannot be so easily
dismissed. Affirming that God is the source of objective moral
rules and that we are created for a voluntary relationship with
God is one way of describing a fundamental and ineradicable hu-
man experience. While the conventionalist, subjectivist and nihil-
ist may claim that humans create their own meaning and rules,
we do not experience ourselves as creator but as creature. We ex-
ist as part of a universe that we have not made and that we can
only barely control. We also perceive an underlying order to the
realities that confront us, and we seek the grounding and source of
this order. We desire to know the meaning and purpose of the
world and our place in it. Why, we ask, does the world exist and
for what purpose have I been created? As we ask these questions,
we find ourselves in relationship to this source or grounding of all
that is - this transcendent and perhaps also imminent Reality
that underlies and defines our experience. We also find that this
relationship is fundamentally free. We seek to know and we have
been created to understand, and understanding cannot be com-
pelled but only informed. As Thomas Jefferson argued, "God hath
created the mind free,"8' and as Locke also explains, "such is the
nature of the understanding that it cannot be compelled to the be-
lief of anything by outward force."8 2 There is always a gap between
ourselves and the Reality we seek to know, and much remains a
mystery. However, this mystery motivates us, excites us, beckons
us and draws us in, and our understanding grows. Through reason
and deliberative thought and investigation, through intuition and
feeling, through the counsel of others and the teachings of the
great religious traditions, our knowledge develops, and the rela-
81. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1779),
reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 77, 77 (Philip B. Kurland &
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
82. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 18 (Patrick Romanell
ed., 2d ed. Bobbs-Merrill 1955) (1689).
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tionship that we have been created for deepens through freedom.
Part of what we desire to know is how to live in proper rela-
tionship to the Reality that underlies our existence, and this is the
field of morality. We have been made with a capacity to think in
moral terms, to judge our actions right or wrong, not just advan-
tageous or disadvantageous, wise or foolish, and it is in our moral
actions that our relationship to the Reality that has created us
and beckons us is lived out. We desire to do good and avoid evil,
but we know that we do not define what is right and what is
wrong. Rather, the very concept of good and evil is a gift as is the
voice of conscience within us that judges right from wrong. As
Christian tradition observes and teaches, "[i]n the depths of his
conscience, man detects a law which he does not impose upon
himself, but which holds him to obedience." 83 In our pursuit of
moral knowledge, we seek to understand the demands of con-
science more fully. We seek to live in harmony with the Reality
that speaks through conscience, and we seek to conform our ac-
tions to our created nature and purposes.
Western religious traditions interpret this Reality that speaks
through conscience as a personal God who at once transcends the
world that He has created and is also directly involved in it. Our
ability to reflect upon our world and our place within it and our
drive to understand its meaning demonstrates our fundamental
openness and orientation to this personal God. We are created for
communion with God,84 and the questions that we ask are "the
echo of a call from God."85 The voice of moral conscience is the
"messenger"86 of a God who has written his law on our hearts,8 7
and in our desire and capacity to understand our world and seek
83. SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, GAUDIUM ET SPES: PASTORAL CONSTITUTION
ON THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD 16 (1965) [hereinafter GAUDIUM ET
SPES], reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE
166, 174 (David J. O'Brien & Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1992).
84. Id. 19, at 176.
85. POPE JOHN PAUL II, VERITATIS SPLENDOR 7, at 17 (Daughters of St.
Paul) (1993).
86. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 1778 (Liguori Publications
1994) (quoting John Henry Cardinal Newman, Letter Addressed to the Duke
of Norfolk (1874), in 2 CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES FELT BY ANGLICANS IN CATHOLIC
TEACHING 171, 248 (London, Longmans, Green 1920).
87. Romans 2:15; see also GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 83, 16, at 174
("For man has in his heart a law written by God.").
2005] FOUNDATIONS FOR FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE 383
beyond to its source, "we share in the light of the divine mind."88
To be sure, sin separates us from the God we seek, and the judg-
ment of conscience is clouded as is our understanding of other
matters. Our fallen nature rebels against the voice of conscience
even when it is heard. However, God discloses himself within
revelation, and according to Christian belief, in the person of
Christ. In Christ, we understand more fully that we have been
created to know and love the God who has first loved us through
the work of creation and the work of redemption accomplished for
us on the Cross. In his suffering and death for us on the Cross,
Christ demonstrates the depths of God's love for humanity, and
we are invited to share in the divine life by imitating this love in
our relationship with others. The radical example of Christ's sacri-
fice on the Cross sums up the moral law and provides the light for
clouded conscience, and through God's mercy, we receive grace to
obey that law with a willing heart. In the Cross, we discover the
answer to our questions about the meaning of life, 89 and our rest-
less hearts at last find rest.90
Not all religious traditions envision the Reality which grounds
our existence as a personal God who is actively involved in the
lives of his creatures, and for some traditions, this Reality may be
more imminent than transcendent. However, all religious tradi-
tions address and seek to understand more fully our relationship
to this Reality that is ever-present in our experience. The atheist
may try to deny this relationship, but he cannot escape the ques-
tions that call him back.
Thus, the religious assumptions that Williams and other early
American defenders of conscience make are neither outdated nor
narrowly sectarian. They reflect the fundamental reality of human
experience and the source of human dignity. We have been created
to know and live in relationship to the Reality that has made us,
and this relationship distinguishes us from all other created
88. GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 83, 15, at 174.
89. See VERITATIS SPLENDOR, supra note 85, 2, at 10-11; Kathleen A.
Brady, Catholic Social Thought and the Public Square: Deconstructing the
Demand for Public Accessibility, 1 J. CATHOLIC Soc. THOUGHT 203, 222-23
(2004).
90. Saint Augustine has written, "you have made us for yourself and our
heart is restless until it rests in you." SAINT AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS 3
(Henry Chadwick ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (397-400).
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things. As the Psalmist says, "what is man that thou art mindful
of him, and the son of man that thou dost care for him? Yet thou
hast made him little less than God, and dost crown him with glory
and honor."9' Respect for this relationship between God and per-
sons demands respect for conscience. Individuals must be permit-
ted to seek truth in freedom and to act in accordance with their
understanding of truth whenever possible. It is in our moral ac-
tions that our relationship to the Reality that has created us and
called us to communion is lived out. Forcing individuals to do
what they think is wrong strikes at the heart of this relationship,
and when it does, it strikes at the foundation of human dignity.
91. Psalms 8:4-5.
